The aggregation of many independent estimates can outperform the most accurate individual judgment. This centenarian finding, popularly known as the "wisdom of crowds", has recently been applied to problems ranging from the diagnosis of cancer to financial forecasting. It is widely believed that the key to collective accuracy is to preserve the independence of individuals in a crowd. Contrary to this prevailing view, we show that deliberation and discussion improves collective wisdom. We asked a live crowd (N=5180) to respond to general knowledge questions (e.g. the height of the Eiffel Tower). Participants first answered individually, then deliberated and made consensus decisions in groups of five, and finally provided revised individual estimates. We found that consensus and revised estimates were less biased and more diverse than what a uniform aggregation of independent opinions could achieve. Consequently, the average of different consensus decisions was substantially more accurate than aggregating the independent opinions. Even combining as few as four consensus choices outperformed the wisdom of thousands of individuals. Our results indicate that averaging information from independent debates is a highly effective strategy for harnessing our collective knowledge.
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Whether or not humans benefit from collective decision-making has puzzled mankind since the origin of political thought (1) . Theoretically, aggregating the opinions of many unbiased and independent agents can outperform the best single judgment (2) , which is why crowds are sometimes wiser than their individuals (3, 4) . The idea of wise crowds, however, is at odds with the pervasiveness of poor collective judgment (5) . Human crowds may fail for two reasons. First, human choices are frequently plagued with numerous systematic biases (6) .
Second, opinions in a crowd are rarely independent. Social interactions often cause informational cascades, which correlate opinions, aligning and exaggerating the individual biases (7) . This imitative behavior may lead to herding (5) , financial bubbles (8), rich-get-richer dynamics (9, 10) , zealotry (11) , and violence contagion (12) . Empirical research has shown that even weak social influence can undermine the wisdom of the crowd (13) , and that collectives are less biased when their individuals resist peer influence (14) . Extensive evidence suggests that the key to collective intelligence is to protect the independence of opinions within a group.
However, in many of those previous works, social interaction was operationalized by participants observing others' choices without discussing them. These reductionist implementations of social influence may have oversimplified collective behavior. For example, human groups can communicate their uncertainty and make joint decisions that reflect the reliability of each group member (15) . During peer discussion, people also exchange shareable arguments (16, 17) , which promote the understanding of a problem (18) . Groups can reach consensuses that are outside the span of their individual decisions (18, 19) , even if a minority (20) or no one (18) knew the correct answer before interaction. These findings lead to the following questions: can crowds be any wiser if they debated their choices? Should their members be kept as independent as possible and aggregate their uninfluenced, individual opinions? 110 years after Galton's seminal study (3), we addressed these questions by performing an experiment on a large live crowd (Fig 1A) .
We asked the members of audience (N=5180, 2468 female, aged 30.1±11.6 years) attending a popular TEDx event in Buenos Aires (Argentina) to answer eight questions involving approximate estimates to general knowledge quantities (e.g., what is the height in meters of the Eiffel Tower? c.f. Methods). Each participant was provided with pen and an answer sheet linked to their seat number. The event's speaker (author M.S.) conducted the crowd from the stage (Fig. 1A) . In the first stage of the experiment, the speaker asked eight questions (Supplementary Table 1 ) and gave participants 20 seconds to respond to each of them (stage i1, left panel in Fig. 1A) . Then, participants were instructed to organize into groups of five based on a numerical code in their answer sheet (see Methods). The speaker repeated four of the eight questions and gave each group one minute to reach a consensus (stage c, middle panel in Fig. 1A) . Finally, the eight questions were presented again from stage and participants had 20 seconds to write down their individual estimate, which gave them a chance to revise their opinions (stage i2, right panel in Fig. 1A) . In all individual responses participants also reported their confidence in a scale from 0 to 10.
Responses to different questions were distributed differently. To pull the data across questions, we used a non-parametric normalizing method, used for rejecting outliers (21) (see Methods). Normalizing allowed us to visualize the grouped data parsimoniously, but all our main findings are independent of this step (Supplementary Fig. 1 ). As expected, averaging the initial estimates from participants led to a significant decrease in collective error as increased (F(4,999)= 477.3, p~0; blue lines in Fig. 1B) , replicating the classic wisdom-ofcrowd effects (3) . The average of all initial opinions in the auditorium (N=5180) led to 52% error reduction compared to the individual estimates (Wilcoxon sign rank test, z=61.79, p~0).
We then focused on the effect of debate on the wisdom of crowds, and studied whether social interaction and peer discussion impaired (13, 14) or promoted (17, 18) ). In principle, this could simply result from participants having a second chance to think about these questions, and providing more accurate individual estimates to the group discussion than the ones initially reported. However, our data rules out this possibility since one or two collective estimates are as accurate as 5 or 10 independent initial estimates respectively (Fig. 1B) . In other word this is the result of a crowd of crowds.
Participants used the chance to change their minds after interaction and this reduced their individual error (mean error reduction of 31%, z=19. 16, p=10 -82 ). More importantly, Taken together, these findings are the first demonstration that face-to-face social interaction brings remarkable benefits in accuracy and efficiency to the wisdom of the crowds. These results raise the question of how social interaction, which is expected to instigate herding (7), could have improved collective estimates.
Several observations about the bias and variance of the distributions of estimates help understanding our results. We found that the consensus decisions were less biased than the average of initial estimates (z=2.15, p=0.03, Supplementary Fig. 2 Previous studies have proposed that a fundamental condition to elicit the wisdom-ofcrowds effect is the diversity of opinions (4, 23) . Because we saw that interaction decreased the variance of estimates within groups but increased the variance between groups, we reasoned that sampling opinions from different groups might bring even larger benefits to the crowd. To test this idea, we sampled our population in two ways to test the impact of withinand between-group variance on the wisdom of crowds (Fig. 1C) . In the within-groups condition, we sampled individuals coming from = /5 different groups. This was the same sampling procedure that we used in Fig. 1B . In the between-groups sampling, we selected individuals, each coming from a different group. Because different groups were randomly placed in different locations in the auditorium, we expected that sampling between-groups would break the effect of local correlations, and decrease the collective error. Consistent with our predictions, we found that breaking the local correlations by between-group sampling led to a large error reduction (red solid line vs. red dashed line in ). Adding more decisions using this sampling procedure led to a significant decrease in error (F(4,999)= 249.34, p~0). Aggregating revised estimates from different randomly sampled groups was a highly effective strategy to improve collective accuracy and efficiency, even with a very small number of samples.
Our results are in contrast with an extensive literature on herding (7) and dysfunctional group behavior (24) , which exhorts us to remain as independent as possible. Instead, our findings are consistent with research in collaborative learning showing that "think-pair-share" strategies (25) and peer discussion (18) can increase the understanding of conceptual problems. However, these findings offer a key novel insight largely overlooked in the literature on aggregation of opinions: pooling together collective estimates made by independent, small groups that interacted within themselves increases the wisdom-of-crowds effect. The potential applications of this approach are numerous and range from improving structured communication methods that explicitly avoid face-to-face interactions (26) , to the aggregation of political and economic forecasts (27) and the design of wiser public policies (28) .
The first study on the wisdom of crowds was regarded as an empirical demonstration that democratic aggregation rules can be trustworthy and efficient (3) . Since then, all attempts to increase collective wisdom have been based on the idea that some decisions have larger merit than others and pursued some ideal non-uniform weighting algorithm (14, 29, 30) . For example, previous studies proposed to average the responses of a 'select crowds' defined by higher confidence (14) or expertise (29) , or to select the 'surprisingly popular' minority answers (30) . Although these methods lead to substantial improvements in performance, implementing simple majority rules may still be preferred for other reasons which may include sharing responsibility (31), promoting social inclusion (32), and avoiding elitism or inequality (33) .
Here, we showed that the wisdom of crowds can be increased by simple face-to-face discussion within groups coupled with between-group sampling. Critically, this is achieved without compromising the democratic principle of 'one vote, one value' (34) . The idea that deliberation gives legitimacy and potentially improves democratic choices is not a new one (35). But, to our knowledge, this is the first empirical demonstration that a deliberative democratic procedure increases the wisdom of crowds. Our results support political theories postulating that authentic deliberation, and not simply voting, can lead to better democratic choices (36) .
Methods

Context
The experiment was performed during a TEDx event in Buenos Aires, Argentina ), and the use of a competition bias in a "zero-sum fallacy" game (38) .
Materials
Research assistants handled one pen and one A4 paper to each participant. The A4 paper was folded on the long edge and had four pages. On page 1, participants were informed about their group number and their role in the group. The three stages of the experiment (Fig. 1A) could be completed in pages 2, 3, and 4, respectively. On page 4, participants could also complete information about their age and gender.
Experimental procedure
The speaker (author M.S.) announced that his section would consist in a behavioral experiment. Participants were informed that their participation was completely voluntary and they could simply choose not to participate or withdraw their participation at any time. A total of 5180 participants (2468 female, mean age 30.1 years, s.d.: 11.6 years) performed the experiment. All data were completely anonymous. This experimental procedure was approved by the ethics committee of CEMIC (Centro de Educación Médica e Investigaciones Clínicas Norberto Quirno).
Stage i1: individual decisions
The speaker announced that, in the first part of the experiment, participants would make individual decisions. Subjects answered eight general knowledge questions that involved the estimation of an uncertain number (e.g., what is the height in meters of the Eiffel Tower?). Table 1 ) had one code (e.g. EIFFEL) and two boxes.
Each question (Supplementary
Participants were instructed to fill the first box with their estimate, and the second box with their confidence in a scale from 0 to 10. Before the beginning of stage i1, the speaker completed one exemplary question in the screen, and then read the eight questions.
Participants were given 20 seconds to answer each question.
Stage c: collective decisions
In the second part (stage c), we asked participants to make collective decisions. First, they were instructed to find other members in their group according to a numerical code found in page 1. Each group had six members, and all participants were seated next to each other in two consecutive rows. The speaker announced that there were two possible roles in the group: player or moderator. Each group had five players and one moderator. Each participant could find their assigned role in page 1 (e.g., "You are the moderator in group 765" or "You are a player in group 391"). Players were instructed to reach a consensus and report it to the moderator in a maximum of 60 seconds. Moderators were given verbal and written instructions to not participate nor intercede in the decisions made by the players. The role of the moderators was simply to write down the collective decisions made by the players in their group. Moderators were also instructed to write down an 'X' if there was lack of consensus among the group. Groups were asked to answer four of the eight questions from stage i1 (see Supplementary Table 1 ). The speaker read the four questions again, and announced the moments in which time was over.
Stage i2: Revised decisions
Finally, participants were allowed to revise their individual decisions and confidence. The speaker emphasized that this part was individual, and read all eight questions of stage i1 again.
Data collection and digitalization
At the end of the talk, we collected the papers as participants exited the auditorium. Over the week following the event, five data-entry research assistants digitalized these data using a keyboard. We collected 5180 papers: 4232 players and 946 moderators. Many of these 946 potential groups had incomplete data due to at least one missing player; overall, we collected 280 complete groups. All data reported in Fig. 1 is based on those 280 complete groups (1400 players). For the comparison between individual, collective, and revised estimates, we focus on the four questions answered at stage c.
Non-parametric normalization
The distributions of responses were spread around different values on each question (Supplementary Figure 1) . To normalize these distributions, we used a non-parametric approach inspired in the outlier detection literature (21) . We calculated the deviance of each data point around the median, and normalized this value by the median absolute deviance
where is the distribution of responses. This procedure could be regarded as a nonparametric z-scoring of the data.
The rationale for normalizing our data was twofold. First, we used this procedure to reject outliers in the distribution of responses. Following previous studies (21 ) , we discarded all responses with that deviated from the median in more than 15 times the median absolute deviance. The second purpose of normalization was to average our results across different [1] questions. This helps the visualization of our data, but our findings can be replicated on each question separately without any normalization (Supplementary Fig. 1 ).
Data analysis
To compute all our curves in Fig. 1 , we subsampled our crowd in two different ways: either by choosing individuals that interacted in = /5 different groups (within-groups sampling) or by choosing individuals from different groups (between-groups sampling). All curves in Fig. 1B and the solid line in Fig. 1C were based on the within-groups sampling condition; the dashed line in Fig. 1C is from the between-groups sampling condition. For a fair comparison between conditions, we computed the errors using exactly the same subsamples in our crowd.
For each value of , we considered 1,000 iterations of this subsampling procedure.
In the case of = 5, each iteration randomly selected 5 of our 280 complete groups (Fig 1C sketches one exemplary iteration) . In the within-groups condition, we computed the crowd error of each of the 5 groups (the error of the average response in stages i1 and i2, and the error of the collective response in stage c) respecting the identity of each group. Finally, we averaged the 5 crowd errors and stored their mean value as the within-groups error for this iteration. In the between-groups sampling, we combined responses from individuals coming from different groups. We computed the error for 1,000 random combinations contingent on the restriction that all individuals belonged to different groups. Finally, we averaged all crowd errors and stored this value as the between-groups error for this iteration.
The same procedure was extended for > 5. We randomly selected of our 280 groups on each of our 1,000 iterations. In the within-groups condition, we selected all possible combinations of individuals coming from groups, and computed their crowd error. We averaged the crowd error for all possible combinations and stored this value as the withingroups error for this iteration. In the between-groups condition, we randomly selected 1,000 combinations of individuals coming from different groups, and computed their crowd error. 
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